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I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and
Constitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners
and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain
1
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In DeCook v. Olmsted Medical Center, Inc., the Minnesota
Supreme Court issued a decision that may signal a shift towards a
2
more pragmatic application of Minnesota’s rules of service. In
DeCook, the court held that a party can properly amend a summons
and complaint as long as it does not substantially burden the
3
defendant. In addition, the court held that alternative methods of
service through an agent, such as e-mail, are sufficient if consented
4
to by the defendant. As part of this decision, the court held that
the plaintiff has the initial burden of producing evidence to show
an alternative method of service existed, which, if met, shifts the
burden to the defendant to establish that the method of service was
5
ineffective.
This Note begins by giving a selected history of service and
6
rules of civil procedure, an overview of traditional and technology7
aided ways of effectuating service, and an overview of the history of
8
notice pleading in federal and Minnesota state courts. Next, this
1. Thomas Jefferson Quotes, GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes
/94629-i-am-not-an-advocate-for-frequent-changes-in-laws (last visited Sept. 28,
2016).
2. See DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2016).
3. Id. at 269.
4. Id. at 271–72.
5. Id. at 271.
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.C.
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Note explores the DeCook decision, discussing the facts of the case
9
and the rationale of both the majority and dissenting opinions.
Although this Note concludes that the majority came to the
correct decision, justice would be better served if the court adopted
10
what this author calls the “reasonable actual notice” standard.
Doing so, this Note contends, would better align with the policy
11
behind both the Federal and Minnesota Rules of Civil procedure
12
and would allow for greater flexibility in a shifting legal landscape.
If Minnesota courts find it prudent to adopt the “reasonable actual
notice” standard, this author proposes a modified burden-shifting
framework that may better ensure disputes are resolved on their
13
merits.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

General History of Service and the Rules of Civil Procedure

Put simply, service occurs in a civil case when a party delivers
14
legal documentation to the defendant being sued. The core
purposes of service are twofold: (1) to provide a court jurisdiction
over the defendant and (2) to put the party being sued on notice of
15
the lawsuit.
In 1938, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
16
Procedure, which included official rules for effective service. In
1947, the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee prepared

9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Sections IV.A.1, 3.
12. See infra Section IV.A.2.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
LAW
DICTIONARY,
14. What
Is
Service
of
Process?,
THE
http://thelawdictionary.org/service-of-process/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016)
(defining service of process as “the term for the delivery of a summons, writ or
subpoena to the opposing party in a law suit”). Many may be familiar with the
common phrase, “You’ve been served”—a phrase often used to depict a process
server serving a party with legal documents. See Kimberly Faber, “You’ve Been
Served.” To Say it or Not to Say it?, SERVENOW (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.serve
-now.com/articles/1277/youve-been-served. This phrase, however, is not required
by law and is rarely said by process servers outside of television and film. See id.
15. In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 2013).
16. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998).
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17

a set of rules closely mirroring the federal rules. Those rules, now
known as the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, were
18
subsequently adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1952.
Changes to the Minnesota rules have been made throughout the
19
years, primarily mirroring developments in the federal rules.
Closely tied to the notion of service is the principle of personal
jurisdiction: a court can exercise authority over a defendant only if
it has personal jurisdiction over that defendant and adequate
20
service of process has occurred. In early American jurisprudence,
21
a court’s jurisdiction could be established only if the defendant’s
property was located in the forum state or the defendant was
22
personally served within the limits of the forum state. Later,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reiterated the preference for
personal service and cautioned against relying on service by
23
publication. Then, in 1945, the Supreme Court began a transition
to a more flexible approach towards personal jurisdiction and
24
service of process. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court
determined that personal jurisdiction over a defendant existed
17. David F. Herr & JoLynn M. Markison, E-Discovery Under the Minnesota
Rules: Where We’ve Been, Where We Might be Headed, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 390, 393
(2014).
18. See id.
19. Id. at 393–94.
20. See Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal
Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 338–40 (2003) (giving a brief
overview of the ways in which the notions of service of process and personal
jurisdiction dovetailed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
21. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1877) (“And so it is laid down
by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation
outside of its territory . . . .”).
22. See id. at 727. The Court in Pennoyer reasoned that the law assumes an
individual is always in “possession” of his or her property, and if a court seizes it,
that individual will be on notice of the seizure as well as the impending suit. Id.
Thus, personal service is not necessary when seizure of the defendant’s property
located in the forum state occurs. Id.
23. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (“There is no dispute that
service by publication does not warrant a personal judgment against a
nonresident. . . . To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely
to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is
to be done.” (internal citations omitted)).
24. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Joelle Lee A.
Nicol, Note, Given an Opportunity to Redefine the Gray Area of “Minimum Contacts,”
The Court in Prince v. Urban Chose to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313,
315–16 (1998).
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when the defendant “establish[ed] sufficient contacts or ties with
the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which [the defendant
25
had] incurred there.”
Additionally, in International Shoe, the Supreme Court
appeared to expand on the notion of allowing different forms of
service: “[i]t is enough that appellant has established such contacts
[26]
with the state that the particular form of substituted service
adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be
27
28
actual.” When interstate commerce became more commonplace,
the Court further shifted focus to ensure that service provided a
29
defendant with fair and reasonable notice of legal action. In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the court laid out
general principles for notice:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections . . . . But if with due regard for
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these
conditions are reasonably met the constitutional
30
requirements are satisfied.
The principles articulated in Mullane continue to guide the legal
31
system’s view of service of process today.
25. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
26. “Substituted service” is defined as “service by leaving a copy of the
process at the residence or abode or place of business of the defendant.” 72 C.J.S.
Process § 70, Westlaw (databased updated Mar. 2017). Substituted service is
“different and distinct from [personal service],” but “for some purposes
substituted service is deemed equivalent to personal service.” Id.
27. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
28. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220–23 (1957) (“With
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines . . . ma[king] it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.”).
29. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–17
(1950) (reasoning that service by publication affords adequate service as long as it
gives reasonable notice to defendant).
30. Id. at 314–15.
31. See Craig J. Knobbe, Tenth Circuit Survey: Securities Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV.
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Manners of Effectuating Service
1.

Traditional

Minnesota law has often reflected the stringent historical
32
standards of effective service. According to the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure, there are three primary ways of effectuating service
33
on individuals. First, personal service is valid when a summons is
delivered personally to the individual, left at that person’s place of
34
abode, or left with an agent authorized by statute to accept service
35
on the defendant’s behalf. Traditionally, personal service is
deemed ineffective if it is left with an agent who is not authorized
36
to accept service. Second, service can be made by mailing a
summons and complaint to the defendant, provided the defendant
37
returns an included acknowledgment of service form. And third,
in rare circumstances, service by publication constitutes valid
38
service.
39
Unless service is waived, Minnesota commonly does not allow
service that is not authorized by statute or Rule 4 of the Minnesota

903, 904 n.10 (1999) (citing 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1074, at 465 (2d ed. 1987)) (“[Mullane]
generally is recognized as the keystone of modern philosophy regarding the notice
requirement and its importance should not be underestimated.”).
32. See, e.g., Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 514–15, 92 N.W. 461, 462 (1902)
(holding that serving a non-citizen of the state when that individual is not in the
state is unconstitutional).
33. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03, .04, .07.
34. See, e.g., Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 405 (1909)
(holding that usual place of abode is an individual’s residence or the place he is
living at the time of service).
35. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a).
36. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[S]ervice on a party’s attorney is ineffective unless the party has previously
appointed the attorney to accept service.”).
37. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05.
38. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04; see also Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 172, 152 N.W.2d
309, 313 (1967) (holding that service by publication is valid only if it is the sole
option for effective service). For an in-depth discussion on service by publication
in Minnesota, see Jessica Klander, Note, Civil Procedure: Facebook Friend or Foe?: The
Impact of Modern Communication on Historical Standards for Service of Process—
Shamrock Development v. Smith, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 15, 30 N.W. 826, 831 (1886) (“[A]
party . . . may waive anything intended for his benefit—such as notice, or service of
process . . . .”).
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts, however, have
deemed service effective as long as the federal rules of service are
41
substantially complied with. Similarly, despite usually adhering
closely to the rules of service, Minnesota courts have considered
service effective when the plaintiff substantially complies with the
42
rules of service and the defendant has actual notice of suit.
Currently, in Minnesota, substantial compliance combined with
adequate notice has been recognized only when service occurs at a
43
defendant’s usual place of abode. According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, there is “no place [other than the defendant’s
44
residence] significantly more desirable for the papers to be left.”

40. See, e.g., Allen, 590 N.W.2d at 822 (holding that service that is not
authorized by Rule 4 is ineffective).
41. See, e.g., Lavarias v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 09-cv-00120DAE/RLP,
2011 WL 1361555, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 11, 2011) (citing SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d
1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if the plaintiff can demonstrate ‘substantial compliance’ with Rule 4.
Actual notice, however, without substantial compliance with Rule 4, will not
provide personal jurisdiction.”); Munson v. England, No. 04-cv-0248-RRB/CMK,
2008 WL 162774, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) (“Here, plaintiff substantially
complied with Rule 4(i) by sending a copy of the summons and complaint to the
U.S. Attorney’s office. He addressed the envelope to the assistant U.S. Attorney
assigned to this case, whom had contacted him previously, instead of addressed to
the ‘civil process clerk.’ Given the need to liberally construe pro se pleading, the
undersigned finds plaintiff substantially complied with Rule 4, and the U.S.
Attorney’s office was given actual notice.”); In re Chinin USA, Inc., 327 B.R. 325,
333 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Substantial compliance with the service requirements
of Rule 4 is sufficient so long as the opposing party receives sufficient notice of the
complaint. Dismissal is generally not justified absent a showing of prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac, 787 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that service was effective when officer had substantially complied
with service rules by personally leaving notice at the defendant’s place of abode
with an individual who told the officer she would give the notice to defendant and
defendant did in fact have actual notice of suit); O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d
870, 872–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that when service is left at an
individual’s place of abode with an individual who has a “substantial nexus” with
the defendant and the defendant has actual notice of suit, service is effective).
43. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302
(Minn. 2011) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988)) (holding that
the rules governing service should be liberally construed when substitute service
occurs at an individual’s residence and that individual has notice of the suit);
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (“This ‘actual notice’ exception, however, has been
recognized only in cases involving substitute service at defendant’s residence.”).
44. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584 (citing 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31,
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Therefore, substantial compliance combined with actual notice is
45
not sufficient when a defendant is served at his place of business.
Recently, Minnesota courts further discussed the reach of
actual notice. In Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, a dispute
concerning ineffective service for the foreclosure of a townhome,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a party need only
46
substantially comply with the substitute service requirements as
47
long as the defendant has actual notice of suit. In the subsequent
appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this issue,
determining whether Rule 4.03(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
48
Procedure required strict compliance. In its decision, the court
determined that the court of appeals’ reliance on Thiele v. Stich was
49
misplaced. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, “the
statement from Thiele was still dictum and therefore not binding on
50
us.” Thus, the court relied on MacLean v. Lasely to determine that
51
“substitute-service requirements are subject to strict compliance.”
The court went on to quote MacLean, stating that “[i]n making
such substitute service there must be a strict compliance with the
52
statute.” The court in MacLean held that “statutory service is not
dispensed with by the mere fact that defendant may in some way
53
learn of the existence of the papers and an attempted service.” In
turn, the Jaeger court determined that substitute service must be
54
strictly complied with, regardless of the defendant’s actual notice.
§ 1096, at 79).
45. Id. (citing Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (S.D. Ohio 1982))
(“Rule 4 is otherwise taken literally, and cannot be satisfied by service on [a]
defendant’s place of work or business.”).
46. “[S]ubstituted service under Rule 4.03, Rules of Civil Procedure—that is,
service upon an individual by leaving a copy at his usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein—is a form of
‘personal’ service. In fact, Rule 4.03 labels as personal this form of service.” Lebens
v. Harbeck, 308 Minn. 433, 434, 243 N.W.2d 128, 129 (1976); see also 72 C.J.S.,
supra note 26, § 70 (defining “substituted service”).
47. No. A14-0803, 2015 WL 1513982, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2015).
48. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 608–10 (Minn.
2016).
49. See id. at 610–11 (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 584).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 609 (citing MacLean v. Lasely, 181 Minn. 379, 380, 232 N.W. 632,
632 (1930)).
52. Id. (quoting MacLean, 181 Minn. at 380, 232 N.W. at 632).
53. Id. (quoting MacLean, 181 Minn. at 380, 232 N.W. at 632).
54. Id.
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Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governs
55
when an action is commenced. Each section of Rule 3.01 requires
56
a particular form of service for the commencement of an action.
In 2015, the Minnesota legislature enacted an amendment to Rule
3.01(b), allowing for any method of service as long as the parties
57
consent to the alternative method. Thus, parties were given
greater freedom in selecting a convenient method of service, which
signaled a shift towards more practical means of service.
Currently, Minnesota courts rely on a burden-shifting method
58
to determine if an alternative method of service was adequate.
First, to show that a different method of service was valid, the
59
plaintiff is tasked with presenting evidence of an agreement. If the
plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to
60
establish that service was improper. Thus, a defendant fails to
61
meet his burden if he produces no evidence to the contrary.
2.

Using Technology
62

Since 2000, worldwide internet use has risen dramatically.
Today, in the United States alone, nearly eighty-nine percent of the
63
population has access to the internet. The legal system, in turn,
55. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01.
56. Id.
57. MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s comment to 2015
amendment (allowing for consent to e-mail service even though the rules do not
specifically list it as effective service).
58. See, e.g., Holmes v. Conter, 212 Minn. 394, 395, 4 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1942)
(“Defendants’ counsel concedes that the burden is on him to overcome [proof of
effective service] of the deputy sheriff by evidence which has been proven to be
clear and satisfactory.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Godfrey v.
Valentine, 39 Minn. 336, 338, 40 N.W. 163, 164 (1888) (holding that when service
by publication is on the record, other proof of service must be affirmatively
shown); Fish v. Janson, No. A15-1949, 2016 WL 2946263, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 23, 2016) (holding that defendant did not meet his burden of showing that
the residence where he was served was not his usual place of abode).
59. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W. 2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com
/internet-users/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). In the year 2000, 6.8% of the world’s
population had an internet connection; as of 2016, just over 46% of the world’s
population has an internet connection. Id.
63. See id. The United States’ internet access has risen from 43% to almost
89% of the population in the past sixteen years. Id.
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has adapted to this changing landscape and integrated technology
64
use into legal proceedings as well as service of process. For many
years, courts authorized only traditional means of service, such as
65
personal service, service by mail, or service by publication. In
1980, however, a federal court first acknowledged the use of
66
different technologies in service of process. In New England
Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co.,
67
a federal court allowed service through “Telex” to defendants in
68
Iran because other means of service were not practicable. In its
opinion, the court reasoned that “[j]ustice demands that a
substitute form of service be formulated—one calculated to provide
defendants with adequate notice of the pendency and nature of the
69
instant suits.” Notably, the court opined that the legal system
“cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology . . . . No
longer must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can
receive complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very
70
office . . . .”
In the years following, courts sparingly authorized service
through facsimile. For instance, in In re International Telemedia
Associates, Inc., a district court judge found that the defendant was
64. See, e.g., 25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to Change Courts,
U.S. CTS. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-years
-later -pacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts (opining that programs such
as PACER and electronic filing in the federal court system have “reduced stress” by
implementing “an efficient system” that “[e]ven skeptics have grown to love”).
65. See supra Section II.A.
66. See New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. Telex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/telex (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) (defining Telex as “a system of communication
in which messages are sent over long distances by using a telephone system and
are printed by using a special machine (called a teletypewriter)”). Telex is
essentially an early hybrid of the telegraph, text messaging, and facsimile. Many
people, like this author, may have no idea what a Telex communication is or have
never seen a “teletypewriter.” This arguably shows how important flexible rules
governing service are, as any kind of technology (mail, fax, e-mail) could become
obsolete in the not-so-distant future.
68. New England Merchants, 495 F. Supp. at 81. In this instance, the judge
acknowledged there was little to no precedent for authorizing service via Telex.
However, the judge found that the breakdown of American and Iranian relations
coupled with the defendants’ avoidance of service made Telex an effective method
of service. Id. at 80–81.
69. Id. at 81.
70. Id.
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evading service and authorized facsimile as an alternate method of
71
service. Furthermore, Telemedia Associates was the first federal case
72
that authorized e-mail as an alternative method of service. Later,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals authorized the use of e-mail to
serve an international online company that listed only an e-mail
73
address on its website. Following this decision, other courts set the
general standard that service via e-mail could be authorized if other
74
methods of service had proven unsuccessful.
An illustrative example of technology’s assistance in the legal
field comes in the form of the “best notice practicable” standard in

71. 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding facsimile, among
other methods, to be a proper alternative method of service because it was
“virtually impossible” to locate the defendant and “effect service by any of the
traditional means specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
72. Id. at 722 (“Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Trustee’s
service of process upon Diaz by facsimile transmission, electronic mail, and mail to
his last known address provides a sufficient basis for the Court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Diaz.”).
73. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that the only contact address for the
defendant was an e-mail address, and thus, e-mail was the best method to apprise
the defendant of the suit. The court went on to say:
RII had neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal.
If any method of communication is reasonably calculated to provide
RII with notice, surely it is email—the method of communication
which RII utilizes and prefers . . . . Indeed, when faced with an
international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal
court, email may be the only means of effecting service of process.
Certainly in this case, it was a means reasonably calculated to apprise RII of
the pendency of the lawsuit, and the Constitution requires nothing more.
Id. (emphasis added). The court in Rio Properties, however, also discussed concerns
about e-mail service, including limitations with the use of electronic signatures,
confirming receipt of a message, and attaching exhibits to the service
documentation. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit directed district courts to balance the
limitations with the benefits in each dispute. Id.
74. See, e.g., Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-cv-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) (finding service by electronic means
constitutionally permissible and holding that “a party need not exhaust all possible
methods of service” for a court to authorize electronic service but must show it has
“reasonably attempted to effectuate service on the defendant(s)”); Hollow v.
Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705, 707–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (authorizing service by email in divorce proceedings when defendant moved to Saudi Arabia and plaintiff
“exercised due diligence” by trying to serve defendant through his employer and
through an international process service).
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75

class action lawsuits. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin is a widely
76
influential case on the “best notice practicable” requirement. In
Eisen, the Supreme Court held that it was mandatory to include
individual notice to class members who can be identified through
77
reasonable efforts. Courts, however, have hesitated to set a
standard for those who cannot be identified through reasonable
78
effort. In the twenty-first century, new technology—especially the
internet—has shaped the legal system’s view of what constitutes
79
For instance, some courts have
best practicable notice.

75. The concerns regarding giving notice to a large number of plaintiff class
members is admittedly different than the concerns regarding giving adequate
notice to individual defendants. However, the seminal case for both class actions
and service of process is widely considered to be Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank.
See 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Both service of process and decisions regarding class
actions rely on Justice Jackson’s stated principle that “the fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 314 (quoting Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). Notably, Mullane’s principles have been
codified in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing class
actions, while they have not been codified in Rule 4, governing service. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Nonetheless, courts
today continue to use the standards set out in Mullane for service of process
analysis without those standards being expressly codified in the rules governing
service. See Knobbe, supra note 31, at 904 n.10.
76. Brian Walters, “Best Notice Practicable” in the Twenty-First Century, 2003
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003) (“The most influential case on the ‘best notice
practicable’ requirement of FRCP 23(c)(2) is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline.”).
77. 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (“Accordingly, each class member who can be
identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may request
exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity to press his claim
separately or that he may remain in the class and perhaps participate in the
management of the action.”).
78. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing In re Franklin Nat’l Bank Sec. Litig., 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir.
1978)) (“What is ‘the best notice practicable under the circumstances’ and what
constitutes ‘reasonable effort’ is a determination of fact to be made in the
individual litigation.”).
79. See generally Robert H. Klonoff et. al., Making Class Actions Work: The
Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008) (discussing the
opportunity the internet gives to class members to participate actively in class
action litigation); Jennifer Mingus, E-Mail: A Constitutional (and Economical) Method
of Transmitting Class Action Notice, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (1999) (discussing the due
process implications, practicality, and cost savings of e-mail, as well as the
difficulties courts have had embracing use of e-mail for notice in class action
litigation).
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increasingly accepted the use of e-mail as best practicable notice.
With technological growth and society’s increasing dependence on
technology, courts have begun to interpret the best practicable
notice standard as allowing, and at times requiring, the use of
81
newer technology in class action notice. Thus, because an
individual’s due process rights may be violated if notice is not
proper, some courts have adapted to societal change and found
newer technological means to be the “best practicable notice under
82
the circumstances.” As illustrated in the following paragraph, the
area of service may already be experiencing a similar adaptation.
In general, Minnesota has mirrored federal courts’ adoption
83
of technology in its rules of civil procedure. In 1996, the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure first included a mechanism for
84
service by facsimile. Without consent, however, facsimile remains
85
an ineffective method of service in Minnesota. It was not until
80. See, e.g., Keirsey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2014 WL 644697, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (“The Court already preliminarily approved the form of
class notice, primarily through email . . . . Moreover, information about the case
has been available at the class website and through internet news sources. The
Court finds that the form and method of notice was proper.”); see also Elizabeth
M.C. Scheibel, #rule23 #classaction #notice: Using Social Media, Text Messaging, and
Other New Communications Technology for Class Action Notice and Returning to Rule
23(c)(2)(b)’s “Best Notice Practicable” Standard, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1331,
1349 (2016) (providing examples of e-mail being used for notice).
81. See, e.g., In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that notice via the internet, combined with other forms
of notice, such as mail, constituted adequate notice).
82. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[N]ewspaper notice alone is not always an adequate alternative to individual
notice. The World Wide Web is an increasingly important method of
communication, and, of particular pertinence here, an increasingly important
substitute for newspapers.” (internal citations omitted)).
83. See Herr & Markison, supra note 17, at 394.
84. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.02(c) advisory committee’s note to 1996
amendment (“Most of Rule 5.02 is new and for the first time provides for service
by facsimile . . . . Service by facsimile has become widely accepted and is used in
Minnesota either by agreement or presumption . . . . [But] express authorization
for service by facsimile is appropriate and preferable . . . .”).
85. See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Cty. of Clay, 711 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2006)
(“Because facsimile service is not authorized for service of initiating documents in
the rules of civil procedure, we agree with the tax court that faxing the petitions to
the offices of the county assessor and the county attorney did not effect valid
service.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997))
(“Facsimile transmission of a summons is not permitted under rule 4. Service was
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2015 that the Minnesota rules committee acknowledged e-mail as a
86
method of service. The rules committee amended Rule 3.01(b) to
allow for service “made by mail or other means consented to by the
87
defendant.” The comment to the amendment specifies that “a
party may consent to service by ordinary electronic mail even
88
though the rules do not otherwise provide for it.” Although an
agreement must be in place, this change signals an
acknowledgement of the prevalence new technology has in the
89
legal world.
3.

Amending Service

An overview of methods of service would not be complete
without discussing the ability to amend a chosen method of service.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts the discretion
to allow a party to amend service, pleadings, motions, and the
90
like. Similarly, as early as 1890, Minnesota courts and rules have
91
also allowed procedural amendments. For instance, in Lockway v.
Modern Woodmen of America, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a summons could be amended to cure an inadvertent
92
mistake. Today, Rule 4.07 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the amendment of documents that have been
therefore ineffective, and the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over
Allen.”).
86. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment (“This rule is amended to add the explicit provision for consent to
service by any means in subdivision (b), not only service by mail. If the party to be
served consents to service, the service is effective and constitutionally sound
regardless of method. Thus, a party may consent to service by ordinary electronic
mail even though the rules do not otherwise provide for it.” (emphasis added)).
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See generally Svetlana Gitman, (Dis)service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule
4 to Comply with Modern Usage of Technology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (2012)
(discussing the prevalence of technology in the American legal system and
proposing the theory that service through technological means would better satisfy
due process in certain situations).
90. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(2) (“The court may permit a summons to be
amended.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(l)(3) (“The court may permit proof of service to be
amended.”).
91. See, e.g., Burr v. Seymour, 43 Minn. 401, 402, 45 N.W. 715, 716 (1890)
(“The power of the court to amend the record in such a case cannot be
doubted.”).
92. 116 Minn. 115, 118, 133 N.W. 398, 399 (1911).
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served. Rule 4.07 allows for amendment of summons, other
process, or proof of service if the court, in its discretion,
93
determines that a party’s substantial rights will not be prejudiced.
Thus, amendments are encouraged to help ensure a dispute is
resolved on its merits and not simply dismissed on a mere
94
technicality.
C.

The Notice Pleading Standard

When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in
95
1938, a more flexible standard of pleading was introduced. In fact,
Rule 8, governing pleadings, calls only for “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
96
Although initially challenged, the rule governing
relief.”
97
pleadings remained unchanged. In 1957, in Conley v. Gibson, the
Supreme Court held that “a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
98
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .” For
the most part, courts followed the standard laid out in Conley v.
99
Gibson.
93. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07; see also Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hosps., 240 Minn.
505, 514, 62 N.W.2d 73, 79 (1953) (“[A]mendments shall be given freely when
justice so requires.”).
94. Cf. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (“[T]he
requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and . . .
‘mere technicalities’ should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its
merits.”). Furthermore, invoking this very same principle, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in DeCook, determined that if the defendant is not substantially prejudiced,
a plaintiff may amend a summons that was not signed by an attorney licensed to
practice in Minnesota to include a signature of an attorney admitted to the
Minnesota Bar. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn.
2016).
95. Cf. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he federal rules were intended to remove
the rigidity of the codes and common law and allow the pleader to use his own
judgment about how to tell his story.”).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
97. See, e.g., Jason A. Cantone et. al., Whither Notice Pleading?: Pleading Practice
in the Days Before Twombly, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 23, 28 (2014) (“[In 1955] [t]he Advisory
Committee stated that the original rule ‘adequately sets forth the characteristics of
good pleading . . . and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as
the basis of his claim for relief . . . .’”).
98. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
99. Cantone, supra note 97, at 29–32 (discussing how the Supreme Court
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In 2007 and 2009, however, the Court issued decisions widely
regarded as heightening pleading standards. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Court held that Conley “ha[d] earned its retirement”
and a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim of relief
100
that is plausible on its face.” Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
the Court further clarified these standards when it held that
conclusory statements or mere recitals of elements in a complaint
101
will not survive a motion to dismiss.
When the United States Supreme Court introduced its
102
“plausibility” standard for pleadings, many states followed suit;
103
Minnesota, however, did not. The Minnesota rule governing
pleading states, in part, that “a pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief . . . shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim
largely followed the pleading standard it laid out in Conley in the fifty years after its
decision). But see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987 (2003) (discussing how federal courts imposed non-rule heightened
pleading standards after Conley).
100. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 570 (2007). Interestingly
enough, the Court in Twombly made it clear that it was not applying a heightened
standard of pleading, likely confusing many commentators, legal scholars, and law
students alike. See id. at 569 n.14.
101. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In setting this standard, the
Court introduced a two-pronged approach when considering a motion to dismiss:
first, a court must remove all pleadings that are mere conclusions; then, a court
will consider “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
102. See, e.g., Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass.
2008) (“We agree with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Conley language, which
is the language quoted in our decision in Nader v. Citron . . . and we follow the
Court’s lead in retiring its use.”); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 788
N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010) (“[W]e hold that to prevail against a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”); Sisney v. Best Inc.,
754 N.W.2d 804, 809 (S.D. 2008) (“[W]e adopt the Supreme Court’s new
standards.”). But see, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz.
2008) (declining to adopt the Twombly-Iqbal “plausibility” standard); Hawkeye
Foodservice Distribution, Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa
2012); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 437
(Tenn. 2011); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash.
2010).
103. See Stephen C. Rathke, Pleadings Plain or Plausible: Minnesota Claims
Survive Twombly/Iqbal Challenge, BENCH & B. MINN. (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://mnbenchbar.com/2014/10/pleadings-plain-or-plausible/ (discussing that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to adopt the Twombly-Iqbal standard
that is now used in federal courts).
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for
104
judgment for the relief sought.” This rule highlights Minnesota’s
notice pleading standard—one that is met as long as documents
involved in pleading put the party being sued on reasonable notice
105
of legal action. Thus, Minnesota continues to follow the original
notice pleading standard laid out in Conley v. Gibson and has
106
refused to adopt Twombly-Iqbal’s “plausibility” standard.
It is
therefore important to address the history of Minnesota’s notice
pleading standard and the state’s rejection of the Twombly-Iqbal
standard.
In 1963, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a decision,
Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, making it clear it intended to
follow the standard of notice pleading laid out in the Federal Rules
107
of Civil Procedure. This standard remained unchallenged until
108
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions of 2007 and 2009, respectively. In
104. MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
105. See Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 917–18 (Minn.
2012) (“Minnesota is a notice-pleading state that does not require absolute
specificity in pleading, but rather requires only information sufficient to fairly
notify the opposing party of the claim against it.”).
106. See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014).
107. 265 Minn. 391, 394, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963). The court, in its decision,
clearly laid out the purpose of Rule 8 and the way in which it governs pleadings in
Minnesota courts:
One of the fundamental changes intended by the adoption of our
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly as embodied in Rule 8, was to
permit the pleading of events by way of a broad general statement
which may express conclusions rather than, as was required under
code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The functions of a pleading today are simply to give fair notice
to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient
clarity to disclose the pleader’s theory upon which his claim for relief is
based . . . . No longer is a pleader required to allege facts and every
element of a cause of action. A claim is sufficient against a motion to
dismiss based on Rule 12.02(5) if it is possible on any evidence which
might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the
relief demanded. To state it another way, under this rule a pleading
will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which
could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would
support granting the relief demanded.
Id. at 394–95, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
108. Cf. Paul E. D. Darsow, Resolving the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin Paradox:
Considerations for Applying Twombly and Its Progeny to Pleading and Rule 12 Motion
Practice in Minnesota’s State Courts, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 437, 440 (2013) (“Twombly
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2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court first cited Twombly in Hebert v.
109
City of Fifty Lakes. Two years later, the court further addressed
110
These
Twombly when it decided Bahr v. Capella University.
decisions created tension between the Franklin standard and the
111
standard many inferred from Hebert and Bahr.
In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved this tension
112
when it decided Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. Walsh addressed whether
the plaintiff’s claim of insufficient service should survive the
113
pleading stage. In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
expressly rejected the plausibility standard and held that the
114
plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief. First, the
court determined that the plain language of Rule 8.01 does not
115
include the word “plausible” in any sense. Second, the court
and its progeny represent a profound change in pleading and Rule 12 motion
jurisprudence which is impacting pleading and quite possibly Rule 12 motion
practice in Minnesota’s state courts.”).
109. 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008). Hebert, however, relied heavily on the
generous pleading standards laid out in Franklin and determined that the
pleadings contained enough facts to state a claim for relief. Id. The court only
included Twombly in a “see also” citation for the proposition that a pleading
containing only legal conclusions will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id.
110. 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). Here, the court seemed to consider a
plausibility threshold in its analysis when it wrote, “[W]as Bahr’s opposition based
on a legal theory and facts that are plausible? Bahr cannot merely claim a
reasonable belief that the practices she opposed were forbidden by the MHRA and
thereby avoid scrutiny of her claim.” Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
111. Hebert and Bahr, by referencing the heightened “plausibility” standard
that deviates from Franklin’s notice pleading standard, seemingly created a tension
between the two schools of thought in Minnesota’s legal community. See Darsow,
supra note 108, at 440 (discussing the need for the court to resolve what the
author deems the “Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox”).
112. See 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014) (“We granted review in this case to
decide a question of great interest and consequence to parties and their lawyers in
civil cases: whether the plausibility standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly . . . and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . applies to civil pleadings in Minnesota state
court. We conclude that it does not.”); Rathke, supra note 103, at 24 (“On August
6, 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court answered the question in Walsh v. U.S.
Bank, N.A. The court determined that no compelling reason exists to depart from
the traditional pleading standard for civil actions (short and plain) by following
Twombly/Iqbal and declined to do so.”).
113. Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 601.
114. Id. at 606–07 (“Accordingly, we decline to adopt the plausibility standard
. . . . Therefore, Walsh’s complaint satisfies the traditional pleading standard for
civil actions in Minnesota.”).
115. Id. at 604 (“Noticeably absent from Rule 8.01—and, for that matter, from
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determined that the plausibility standard is out of line with the
purpose and history of Minnesota Rule 8.01 “as a preference for
116
And third, Walsh
non-technical, broad-brush pleadings.”
established five reasons for why the context of Rule 8.01 does not
117
align with the plausibility standard. Ultimately, the court held
that U.S. Bank did not produce a compelling reason for adopting
118
the plausibility standard. Thus, Minnesota courts today continue
to adhere to the traditional, less stringent notice pleading
119
standard.
III. THE DECOOK DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

On January 22, 2010, medical personnel at Olmsted Medical
Center delivered Jennifer and Ryan DeCook’s daughter, Mya
120
Four years later, in January 2014, the DeCooks
DeCook.
attempted to bring a medical malpractice suit against Olmsted
Medical Center (“Olmsted”) and several individual employees:

the rest of our rules of civil procedure—is the word ‘plausible’ or any variation of
it. U.S. Bank does not, and cannot, provide a textual basis for converting the words
‘showing’ and ‘entitled’ into a plausibility standard.”).
116. Id. at 605 (“[The plausibility standard] raises the bar for claimants . . .
and thereby conflicts with Rule 8.01’s preference for non-technical broad-brush
pleadings.”).
117. Id. at 605–06. The five reasons the court gave were: (1) if a rule requires
more specific factual pleading, such as Rule 9 governing “Pleading Special
Matters,” it will expressly say so; (2) the “rules of civil procedure express a strong
preference for short statements of fact in complaints”; (3) the given sample
complaints demonstrate a preference for short and simple statements of fact; (4)
the rules already provide for steps to ensure a complaint is not overly vague; and
(5) there are already mechanisms in place to reduce the cost of discovery. Id.
Some may question the Minnesota Supreme Court’s given reasons because both
the federal and Minnesota rules governing pleadings contain identical text.
However, the court specifically addressed this concern when it wrote, “We decline
to [adopt the plausibility standard] despite the fact that the relevant text of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) is identical to the text of Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. The similarities
between the federal rules and our rule make Twombly and Iqbal ‘instructive,’ but
not binding.” Id. at 603 (internal citations omitted).
118. Id. at 604 (“The relevant text of Rule 8.01 is the same today as it was
when Olson and Franklin were decided. U.S. Bank has not presented a compelling
textual reason to overrule those cases.”).
119. Id.
120. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc. 875 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. 2016).
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Brenda Hanson, Darlene Pratt, Kenneth Palmer, Jack Perrone,
121
Kimberly McKeon, and Ashley Morrow.
The DeCooks’ attorneys, Stephen Offutt and Patrick
Thronson, contacted Olmsted in January of 2014 in an attempt to
122
commence service on the defendants. At that time, Barbara
Graham, Olmsted’s compliance officer, informed Offutt and
Thronson that she was authorized to accept service for each
123
defendant and was willing to do so by e-mail. On January 14,
2014, the DeCooks’ attorneys emailed a copy of the summons and
124
complaint to Graham.
The following day, on behalf of all
defendants, Graham returned a signed acceptance of service form
125
to Offutt and Thronson.
In response, on January 31, 2014, the defendants filed a Joint
126
and Separate Motion to Dismiss. In their accompanying memo,
which was not filed until March 4, 2014, the defendants argued, in
part, that: (1) the summons and complaint were defective; (2) the
defendants were not served personally; and (3) the claimed service
127
by e-mail was ineffective. Furthermore, the defendants filed two
affidavits from Graham, neither of which included a denial that any
of the six individual defendants had authorized her to accept
128
service on their behalf.

121. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., No. 55-cv-14423, 2014 WL 4798500 at *1–2
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2014), aff’d, No. A14-1180, 2015 WL 1880319 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 27, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. DeCook v. Olmsted Med.
Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263.
122. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 265. In addition, a minor point of contention in
DeCook was whether a summons and complaint could be amended when they were
only signed by an attorney not licensed to practice law in Minnesota. Id.
Ultimately, the court, in its discretion, determined that the defendants were not
prejudiced by allowing amendment of the summons and complaint. Id. at 267–68.
Although a discussion regarding amending service is applicable to this author’s
larger argument, the contention surrounding the specific signature is not
discussed further in this Note.
123. DeCook, 2014 WL 4798500 at *1.
124. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 265.
125. Id.
126. The defendants based their Motion to Dismiss on Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(b), (c), and (d) for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and
insufficient service of process, respectively. Id.
127. Id. at 265–66.
128. Id. at 266. In addition, none of the defendants offered an affidavit
showing they had not given Graham authorization to accept service on their
behalf via e-mail. Id.
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After learning of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, counsel
for the DeCooks sent copies of the summons and complaint to the
appropriate sheriff’s offices in an attempt to serve the defendants
129
personally. Pratt was served personally on February 24, 2014;
Hanson was served personally on February 27, 2014; and the
summons and complaint were left with an employee at Olmsted on
February 27, 2014, in an attempt to serve the remaining individual
130
defendants.
The DeCooks first learned that the defendants objected to the
purported defective summons and complaint when, on March 4,
2014, the defendants filed their memorandum accompanying their
131
motion to dismiss. In response, the DeCooks sent an amended
summons and complaint to the appropriate sheriff’s offices to
132
effectuate personal service. Once again, Pratt and Hanson were
personally served while the summons and complaint were left with
133
an Olmsted employee for the remaining defendants.
At the district court level, the court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process and allowed the
134
plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Furthermore, the court
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of
process as to Olmsted, Pratt, and Hanson, as they were served in
135
The district court, however, granted the motion to
person.
136
dismiss as to the remaining four defendants.
In response, Olmsted, Pratt, and Hanson appealed the
decision, arguing that the summons and complaint were ineffective
137
and the opportunity to amend should not have been given. The

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., No. 55-cv-14423, 2014 WL 4798500, at *2
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2014). In addition, the DeCooks attempted to contact the
defendants’ attorneys to determine why they filed a motion to dismiss but were
unsuccessful in doing so. Id.
132. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266.
133. Id.
134. DeCook, 2014 WL 4798500, at *3.
135. Id. at *1. The court reasoned that Graham was authorized to accept
service on Olmsted’s behalf as Olmsted did not have an agent on file to accept
service. Id. at *5.
136. Id. at *1. Their motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds that they
were not personally served and service through Graham was ineffective. Id. at *1,
*5–6.
137. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266.
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DeCooks cross-appealed, arguing that the e-mail sent to Graham on
138
January 14, 2014, constituted effective service for all defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, and the
139
state supreme court granted review of both appeals.
Arguing before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the defendants
asserted that a valid summons did not exist and the district court
140
abused its discretion in allowing the amended process. The
supreme court, however, found these arguments unconvincing
because the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the policies
141
behind the rules supported the lower court’s decision. Based on
the district court’s discretion and the fact that the defendants were
not prejudiced by the amended summons and complaint, the
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals’ decisions and held
142
that a defective summons and complaint can be amended.
On cross-appeal, the DeCooks argued that service via e-mail
through Graham on behalf of all defendants was made effective by
143
agreement. The DeCooks, the court found, had offered evidence
of a valid alternative agreement with Graham, while the defendants
144
offered no evidence to contradict the DeCooks’ evidence. In
turn, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the district
court erred in finding that the record had no evidence of an
alternative agreement, reversed the lower court’s decision in part,
and remanded the case to the district court to proceed against the
145
previously dismissed defendants. Thus, the majority held that
146
alternative e-mail service via an agent can be effective.
B.

The Rationale of the Majority Opinion

In its analysis, the majority considered the plain language of
147
Rules 4.01, 4.07, and 11.01. In doing so, it concluded that the
district court was within its discretion to allow the amendment of a

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 267–69.
See id. at 267–70.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272.
See id.
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.01, 4.07, 11.01; DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266–68.
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defective summons and complaint.
Furthermore, the court
reasoned that discretionary amendments help ensure that cases are
solved on “their merits rather than . . . by dismissal on technical
149
grounds.” Ultimately, the majority concluded that the defendants
were not prejudiced by the amendment because they were on
notice of the suit and the plaintiffs promptly corrected their
150
mistake.
The main point of contention in DeCook, however, arose in the
discussion of the second issue: insufficient service. The majority
and dissent disagreed as to whether the district court erred in
ruling in favor of individual defendants Palmer, Perrone, McKeon,
151
and Morrow for insufficient service.
The majority held that parties can agree to forego formal
152
service, and agreement can provide for service via e-mail through
153
an agent on the defendants’ behalf. To show an alternative
agreement existed, the plaintiff has the burden of submitting
154
evidence of service. If the plaintiff satisfies his burden, the
defendant then has the burden of proving service was
155
insufficient. Here, the majority found that while the record was
156
flush with evidence establishing an agreement was made, the
157
defendants presented no evidence to the contrary.

148. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 266–69.
149. Id. at 268 (citing Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165,
190 N.W.2d 651, 656 (1971)); see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.01 (parties can amend if
justice allows).
150. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 269–70. The majority also pointed out that the
defendants’ only argument that they had been prejudiced was based on a loss of a
statute of limitations defense. Id. at 269 n.5. However, as the court explained in
Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hospitals, loss of a statute of limitations defense on its own
does not constitute prejudice for the sake of disallowing an amended summons.
240 Minn. 505, 512–16, 62 N.W.2d 73, 78–79 (1953).
151. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 272; id. at 272–73 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 270 (majority opinion).
153. Id.; see MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b).
154. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 271 (citing Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754
N.W.2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008)). Furthermore, the majority noted that a plaintiff’s
burden to submit evidence of service “is a low hurdle.” Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id. (“[The defendants] submitted no contradictory evidence.”).
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The Rationale of the Dissenting Opinion

The dissent argued that no alternate agreement was made
because the plaintiffs failed to produce any affirmative agreement
158
Essentially, the dissent took a literal
from the defendants.
approach to Rules 4.05 and 3.01(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
159
Procedure in its analysis.
Put another way, the dissent was
concerned that the DeCooks could not provide an explicit
agreement from Olmsted authorizing alternative service; they
could only provide an e-mail from Graham, Olmsted’s alleged
agent. Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that an individual’s
authorization to accept service on another’s behalf must be shown
160
by actual authority, not just apparent authority, which the dissent
161
concluded that the DeCooks failed to do. In other words, an
individual has the authority to accept service for another only if
that authority is proven, rather than assumed. The majority,
however, countered that argument by deciding that once the
plaintiff has produced evidence of an agreement, the burden shifts
162
to the defendant to show the agent had only apparent authority.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Courts Ensuring Service Gives “Reasonable Actual Notice” Would
Align with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Ultimately, the DeCook court arrived at a fair and practical
conclusion. Currently, Minnesota generally adheres strictly to the
rules of service by seeking to ensure both that defendants have
both actual notice of a suit and that the rules governing service are
163
narrowly followed. Justice, on the other hand, would be better
158. Id. at 274 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[O]ur
rules of civil procedure provide that the plaintiff must establish authority to accept
service of process through the submission of a writing either signed by the
defendant or electronically submitted by the defendant.”); see MINN. R. CIV. P.
3.01(b), 4.05.
159. See DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 272–79 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 277.
161. Id. at 276.
162. Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
163. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (“If the manner of service is not authorized by rule 4, it is not effective.”); see
also Jan I. Berlage, A Clear Message Regarding Service of Process on Joint Ventures & Joint

2017]

DECOOK V. OLMSTED MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

205

served if Minnesota courts focused on ensuring that service takes a
form of what can be called “reasonable actual notice” to the party
being sued. First, in this context, the term “reasonable” aligns most
164
If a party
with the principle of substantial compliance.
substantially complies with the rules of civil procedure governing
165
service, then the “reasonable” element is satisfied. Second, the
term “actual notice” aligns closely with the underlying theory of
166
notice pleading. If service gives the defendant adequate notice of
167
suit against it, then the “actual notice” element is satisfied. Thus,
under this proposed framework, if a plaintiff substantially complies
with the rules of service and the defendant has actual notice of suit,
“reasonable actual notice” is satisfied, and, in turn, service is
effective.
Although the proposed “reasonable actual notice” standard
would be a slight deviation from precedent, the standard would
better serve Minnesota’s best interest. Currently, Minnesota
precedent only considers actual notice when service is effectuated
168
at the defendant’s place of abode. This principal is largely
derived from a case decided over twenty-five years ago: Thiele v.
169
Stich. In Thiele, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that “no
place” other than the defendant’s place of abode is “more desirable
170
for the papers to be left.” This idea, however, seems largely
outdated. Today, people have become increasingly nomadic,
relying on the internet and their phones to receive information, as
Enterprises—Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Investments, Inc. & Mellett v. Fairview
Health Services, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 545, 546 (2002) (“The Minnesota
Supreme Court takes service of process seriously and will strictly construe the rules
applicable to it.”).
164. See Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“When
a party substantially complies with Minn. R. Civ. P. 4, actual notice of the summons
will subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court.” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
165. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Section II.C.
167. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 317, 323 (D.
Minn. 1980) (“The Court has concluded that under the circumstances present
here, the method of service employed by plaintiff was reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice to defendant . . . [a]s defendant Kirkevold received prompt
actual notice of the pendency of this action, the rules governing service should be
liberally construed to uphold the service.”).
168. See supra notes 34, 42, and accompanying text.
169. 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988).
170. Id. at 584.
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171

opposed to mail and door-to-door visitors. In reality, there seems
to be little to no difference between actual notice at a place of
abode and actual notice through other means.
Although some may point to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Jaeger to argue against the substantial compliance
172
portion of the proposed reasonable actual notice standard, the
Jaeger decision relied on antiquated principles set forth in the
court’s 1930 MacLean decision. The court decided MacLean almost
ninety years ago, before the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
173
were adopted. Moreover, the MacLean court discussed statutory
174
Although the Jaeger court
service and not service by rule.
explained that the plain language of Rule 4.03(a) supports the
175
court’s interpretation of substitute service in MacLean, one can
imagine that the principles behind such an old case may be less
176
relevant today. Thiele, on the other hand, was decided far more
177
recently, in 1988. While outdated, Thiele is more recent than
MacLean; therefore, it likely better reflects current legal principles.
171. Cf. Jenara Nerenberg, Unsettled Is Making It Possible for Families To Be
Digital Nomads, Too, FAST COMPANY (June 15, 2016, 6:50 AM),
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3060898/unsettled-is-making-it-possible-for-families
-to-be-digital-nomads-too (discussing an organization that allows individuals and
families to become part of an “office-free, world-traveling life”); Latest
Telecommuting Statistics, GLOBAL WORKPLACE ANALYTICS (Jan. 2016),
http://globalworkplaceanalytics.com /telecommuting-statistics (“Fortune 1000
companies around the globe are entirely revamping their space around the fact
that employees are already mobile. Studies repeatedly show they are not at their
desk 50–60% of the time.”).
172. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2016).
173. Id. at 609 (“MacLean predates our adoption of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure . . . .”). In Jaeger, the court explained that the statement in Thiele v.
Stich, which suggested that substantial compliance with Rule 4 is sufficient, was
only dicta and, thus, need not be followed. Id. at 610 (citing 425 N.W.2d 580, 584
(Minn. 1988)). Dicta or not, however, Thiele was decided significantly more
recently than MacLean and therefore likely better reflects current legal principles.
174. MacLean v. Lasely, 181 Minn. 379, 232 N.W. 632 (1930) (“It is clear that
the proof of service was made in statutory form. It is equally clear that the statutory
substituted personal service was technically made.”).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53.
176. Cf. Zara Watkins, When Is a Case Too Old To Cite? POINTS OF INTEREST
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.onpointexpertise.com/interestpoints/when-is-a-case
-too-old-to-cite (discussing the proposition that the more recent the case citation,
the more persuasive it is).
177. Compare MacLean, 181 Minn. 379, 232 N.W. 632, with Thiele, 425 N.W.2d
580.
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This section illustrates why, and how, the proposed reasonable
actual notice standard would be a better standard for Minnesota. It
begins by exploring the parallels between notice pleading and
178
service of process. Next, this section discusses the advantages of
using technology in a shifting legal landscape while drawing
comparisons to Rule 23’s “best notice that is practicable”
179
standard. Then, it contends that “reasonable actual notice” better
aligns with the policy behind the Minnesota Rules of Civil
180
Procedure. Finally, this section introduces a slightly modified
burden-shifting framework for analyzing reasonable actual
181
notice.
1.

The Principles of Service of Process Should Parallel the Principles
of Notice Pleading

For the most part, Minnesota has closely followed the federal
182
construction and interpretation of the rules of civil procedure.
When the United States Supreme Court changed course and
adopted a more stringent pleading standard, Minnesota had the
183
The Minnesota Supreme Court,
opportunity to follow suit.
however, declined to follow the strict “plausibility” standard and
184
elected to apply the standard it articulated in Franklin. The
Franklin standard states that “[t]he functions of a pleading today
are simply to give fair notice to the adverse party of the incident
giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s
185
theory upon which his claim for relief is based . . . .” This same
principle should guide Minnesota courts’ application of the rules
governing service.
Currently, most methods of service are effective only if they are
186
strictly complied with. This creates a standard in which courts are
178. See infra Section IV.A.1.
179. See infra Section IV.A.2.
180. See infra Section IV.A.3.
181. See infra Section IV.B.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42, 83.
183. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606–07 (Minn. 2014)
184. See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 122 N.W.2d 26
(1963); see also Stresemann v. Jesson, No. A13-1967, 2015 WL 7693339, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to dismiss while acknowledging that the information contained in
plaintiff’s claim would likely not defeat a motion for summary judgment).
185. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
186. See, e.g., Burke v. $2285 U.S. Currency, No. A09-327, 2009 WL 3427014, at
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vastly more concerned with whether a method of service is strictly
appropriate by rule and in theory than whether a particular
187
method of service has real-life practicality. This standard gives
little credence to the practicality of service and largely ignores what
188
may be best in modern day practice. Although there are benefits
to following a narrow legal interpretation—uniformity and
189
predictability, for example —this approach likely resolves
numerous cases on technicalities rather than on the merits.
Adopting a more pragmatic approach—one akin to notice
pleading—would better ensure that meritorious claims do not fall
190
through courts’ cracks.
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2009) (citing Coons v. St. Paul Cos., 486 N.W.2d 771,
776 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)) (“Service by mail requires strict compliance with
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 and is ineffective if an acknowledgement of service is not
signed and returned by the defendant, regardless of the defendant’s actual notice
of the lawsuit.”); see also 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA
PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 4:6 (5th ed. 2016) (“Rule 4 is to be strictly
applied and enforced. A defect in the method of service can deprive a court of
jurisdiction over a defendant. If a defendant has no actual knowledge of an action,
the service methods authorized by Rule 4 are to be strictly followed.”).
187. Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal
Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1126–33 (1989) (discussing
the ways in which territorial service within state boundaries can highlight
impracticalities and proposing a new Rule 4 to help account for said
impracticalities).
188. Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 149–51 (2001) (highlighting the difficulties the Supreme Court
had with adopting clean and consistent rules for exercising personal jurisdiction
over corporations); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 1163, 1194–95 (2013) (discussing the practical inconsistencies with a
court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant is
simply served in the forum state).
189. See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory
Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 612
(2001) (“Generally, rule-of-law value is present in a legal system characterized by
predictability and continuity in the overall legal regime . . . .”).
190. A pragmatic approach to the law is strongly supported by many
prominent legal scholars. For example:
Judge Richard Posner . . . has argued that the goal of statutory
interpretation should be to produce the best results for society. Judge
Posner defines pragmatism, at its core, as “a disposition to base action
on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities,
pieties, and slogans.” Bill Eskridge similarly urges that statutory
interpreters should take public values into account and construe
statutes dynamically—to reflect current social, political, and legal

2017]

DECOOK V. OLMSTED MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

209

Both the rules governing pleading and those governing service
have the same general goal: to put the party being sued on notice
191
of the suit. The primary function of service of process is to give a
party the opportunity to appear in court and be given appropriate
192
due process. Likewise, the main purposes of pleadings are to
notify a party of the merits of a case and give that party the
193
opportunity to defend against them. Although these doctrines
may address slightly different concerns, each deals with the same
underlying principle: giving a defendant the opportunity to defend
against a claim.
Moreover, not only do the pleadings and service doctrines
address the same underlying principle, they are both challenged
194
under the same Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure: Rule 12. If a
defendant does not include a defense of insufficient service of
process in a response pleading or a separate motion to dismiss, that
195
defense will be waived. A defense of failure to state a claim upon
contexts.
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 993 (2016) (citations
omitted).
191. Compare Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006) (stating
that a complaint “should put the defendant on notice of the claims against him”),
with 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 186, § 4:4 (“The purpose of the summons is to
provide notice to the defendant of the action and the effect it may have upon the
interests of the defendant.”).
192. In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 2013) (“Under
Rule 4, the summons or other process is the document that invokes the
jurisdiction of the court, compelling the defendant to appear.” (citation
omitted)).
193. See Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Newton, 646 N.W.2d 888, 899
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The purpose of the complaint is to advise the defendant
as to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
194. Defenses based on pleading and service of process are both located in
Rule 12.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and can be made by either a
responsive pleading or a separate motion. A defense that a party was not served
properly is written as “insufficiency of service of process,” MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(d),
while “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” is the appropriate
defense to assert against a plaintiff’s pleading, MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e).
195. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (“A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (1)
if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12.07, or (2) if it
is neither made by motion pursuant to this rule nor included in a responsive
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15.01 to be made as a
matter of course.”); see also In re Estate of Sangren, 504 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s actual defense was insufficiency of
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which relief can be granted, on the other hand, can be made at
196
However, parties often elect to assert
essentially any point.
defenses against pleadings before a trial begins, by use of a
197
responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. In fact, many believe
that the best time to raise a defense of failure to state a claim is at
198
the motion to dismiss stage, before any discovery has begun.
Thus, many courts already address insufficient service of process
and failure to state a claim for relief at the same juncture. In the
interests of ease of proceedings and judicial economy, Minnesota
would benefit from ensuring these two doctrines more closely
mirror each other.
What is more, other sections of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure address the Rules’ overarching policy of accomplishing
justice. For example, Rule 8.06 specifically declares that “[a]ll
199
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” This
200
same theme largely underlies Rule 4. For instance, Rule 4.07

service of process and the defendant waived that defense by failing to assert it in its
answer).
196. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(b) (“A defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, a defense of failure to join a party indispensable
under Rule 19, and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may
be made in any pleading permitted or ordered pursuant to Rule 7.01, or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.”).
197. See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014). In
Walsh, the court was presented with the interesting situation in which the plaintiff,
after being in default, claimed a defense of insufficiency of service of process, and
the defendant turned around and asserted that complaint failed to state a claim
for relief. Id. at 601. The court was then faced with making decisions both on the
adequacy of service and the adequacy of the complaint. Id. at 606–07.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit, in Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., discussed the
reasoning behind the federal version of failure to state a claim: “there is no
general right to discovery upon filing of the complaint. The very purpose of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ‘is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of
complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery.’” 341 F.3d 559, 566 (6th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738
(9th Cir. 1987)).
198. See, e.g., Mark Thomas Smith, Strategic Motions to Dismiss (or Lack Thereof),
LITIG. NEWS, https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills
/pretrial-motion-dismiss.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) (advising on when the
best time is to file a motion to dismiss).
199. MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.06.
200. Tharp v. Tharp, 228 Minn. 23, 27, 36 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (1949) (discussing
Minnesota courts’ tendency to grant amendments to summons when the
defendant is not prejudiced, and, in turn, finding that the summons was “fatally
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allows for service to be amended, as long as no party is substantially
201
burdened. Both the majority and the dissent in DeCook mirrored
this idea and wrote that a party should be able to amend a
202
complaint as long as the defendant is not excessively burdened.
That same principle should guide a court’s analysis in determining
whether an alternative method of service was effective. Clearly, the
defendants in DeCook had notice of suit and were not prejudiced, as
they filed for dismissal less than three weeks after service was e203
mailed to Graham. Dismissing a case when a party has sufficient
notice would be deciding that case on a “mere technicality,” a
204
problem the courts consistently strive to avoid.
2.

Reasonable Actual Notice Through the Use of Technology Allows
for Greater Flexibility in a Shifting Legal Landscape

Thomas Jefferson may have best articulated the need to
embrace change in our legal system when he said, “[a]s [society]
becomes more developed . . . as new discoveries are made . . .
205
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.”
Often, however, the law is hesitant to adapt to societal change and
206
growth. Likewise, change is often not seen on a wider scale until
defective as in effect to be no summons at all” and thus could not be amended).
201. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07 (“The court in its discretion and on such terms
as it deems just may at any time allow any summons or other process or proof of
service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that substantial rights of
the person against whom the process issued would be prejudiced thereby.”).
Although doing substantial justice and avoiding substantial burden are slightly
different doctrines, each works in concurrence with the other. For instance, it is
certainly just to ensure that no party is substantially burdened, and if a party is
being substantially burdened, substantial justice is likely absent.
202. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn. 2016);
id. at 272 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 265. This is beyond the scope of this note, but this author believes
that the medical industry already has significant protections in place against legal
action. Arguably, medical malpractice suits do not need yet another shield in the
form of mere technicalities of service. Focusing on a standard more in line with
reasonable actual notice could help to level the legal playing field between the
medical industry and ordinary individuals.
204. See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190
N.W.2d 651, 656 (1971) (“[R]ules of civil procedure are designed to effect the
settlement of controversies upon their merits rather than to terminate actions by
dismissal on technical grounds.”).
205. See Thomas Jefferson Quotes, supra note 1.
206. See REACTION AND RESISTANCE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
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the United States Supreme Court sets a precedent that dictates
207
change. Every year, society becomes more and more dependent
on technology, especially as technology becomes further ingrained
208
in law and all facets of life. Thus, an official recognition of e-mail
as a sufficient alternative method of service as recent as 2015 is
209
encouraging, but fairly surprising. Whether service should be
210
allowed through electronic means is the subject of much debate.
When new methods arrive that can reasonably notify a party of an
impending action, the rules governing service should be liberally
211
construed.
Minnesota embraced this increasing prevalence of e-mail in
2015 when the judiciary committee amended Rule 3 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to specify that service may be
accomplished via alternative forms, including e-mail, if consented
212
Notably, however, neither Rule 3 (governing the
to.
commencement of an action) nor Rule 4 (governing service) of the
213
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mentions the use of e-mail.
Similar to notice pleading, Minnesota Rule 3.01(b) and the
accompanying committee note show the Minnesota court system’s
(Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd, & Hester Lessard eds., 2007) (discussing the
resistance that courts have faced in developing feminism into law and policy); see
also Radcliffe Panel Focuses on Law and Social Change, HARV. MAG. (May 25, 2012),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/05/radcliffe-day-panel-focuses-on-law-social
-change (highlighting a panel that discussed how law relies on non-legal social
activists while social activists would not spur change as much without the court).
207. See Linda C. McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, and Social Change, 89
B.U. L. REV. 589, 602 (2009) (arguing that the court has the power and the duty to
play a “catalytic role” in spurring social change). But see Michael Klarman, Lecture
at the Georgetown Law Center’s Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: Courts, Social
Change, and Political Backlash (Mar. 31, 2011) (transcript available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hartlecture/2) (highlighting instances of
backlash to historic Supreme Court decisions).
208. See generally Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: Email and (Due)
Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. REV. 227 (2000).
209. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b).
210. See supra Section II.B.2.
211. Cf. Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (“It has
been held that the Rule on service should be construed liberally to effectuate
service where actual notice of suit has been received by the defendant.”), aff’d, 170
F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1948).
212. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01(b) advisory committee’s comment to
amendment.
213. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01, and MINN. R. CIV. P. 4, with FED. R. CIV. P. 3,
and FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
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willingness to adopt a more pragmatic approach to its rules. As
the legal landscape continues to shift and change, all courts would
be well served by embracing a similar pragmatic approach.
Service by publication illustrates a method of service that
would benefit from technology’s aid. Service by publication may be
used only if it falls into one of the five categories presented in Rule
215
4.04(a). Furthermore, notice by publication continues to be
216
measured under Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” standard.
Minnesota courts, however, have stringently stuck to the text of the
rule and have not yet allowed for electronic notice by publication
217
However, in present society, a
under Mullane’s standards.
defendant’s behavior does not always line up with the rigid rules of
218
service. For example, the current rules governing service of
219
process often fall short when a defendant elects to evade service.
With that in mind, technology-assisted service by publication may
220
be better suited to notify a defendant of suit.
As one
commentator put it, “[t]he rigid construction of the current rule
seeks to protect the defendant’s right to due process, but as
modern society changes, it does so at the cost of fairness and

214. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
215. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a). The five reasons are as follows: (1) a defendant
has left the state to avoid service; (2) a plaintiff acquired a lien; (3) the action is
for divorce and the court requires publication; (4) the action involves real or
personal property; or (5) the action involves a foreclosure or real estate lien. Id.
216. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 173 (2002) (noting that
“[d]ue process requires no more” than the reasonableness of service inquiry from
Mullane).
217. See Klander, supra note 38, at 250 (discussing that the Minnesota
Supreme Court had an opportunity to “reevaluate the elements of an archaic rule
and perhaps broaden them to reflect modern communication” in Shamrock
Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 2008), but instead “articulated a
stricter interpretation of the rule”).
218. See id. at 252. A clear example arises when a defendant is evading service
but not doing so in a way that fits into the rigid five scenarios outlined in Minn. R.
Civ. P. 4.04(a).
219. Id. (“[W]hen the methods for providing notice do not conform to actual
behavior, due process becomes a loophole, rather than a safeguard, for
defendants to evade service.”).
220. See Christopher B. Woods, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation,
52 OKLA. L. REV. 411, 444 (1999) (“Electronic publication . . . could actually offer a
greater likelihood of providing notice than the traditional method of service by
publication.”).
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221

judicial efficiency.” Ignoring technology’s use and place in society
222
may cause negative effects in fairness and efficiency.
Rather than ignoring technology, Minnesota’s rule governing
service by publication specifically acknowledges technology’s place
223
in law in its 2015 amendment. Rule 4.04 allows courts to accept
documents as long as the party signs them under threat of
224
perjury.
The committee included this amendment in
acknowledgement of the difficulty and burden of procuring
225
The 2015
notarization for e-filed and e-served documents.
amendment to Rule 4.04 again demonstrates Minnesota’s
willingness to abandon outdated, technical portions of rules and
embrace an approach that accounts for technology’s effects.
Taking that approach one step further, some commentators
suggest that electronic service should be allowed in most
226
circumstances. For instance, one commentator, Jessica Klander,
contends that the internet’s prevalence in today’s society will
eventually create the situation where businesses and individuals will
227
have more recognizable online addresses than physical addresses.
Therefore, an individual will likely be online much more often
228
than he is at home or checking his physical mailbox. In addition,
Klander asserts that refusing to allow electronic service may be
unconstitutional, as it is the most reasonably calculated way to

221. Klander, supra note 38, at 254.
222. Id.
223. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
224. Id. (stating that “Rule 4.04 is amended to implement a new statute
directing the courts to accept documents without notarization if they are signed
under the following language: ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that everything I
have stated in this document is true and correct’” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 358.116
(2014))).
225. See id. (“The statute allows the courts to require specifically, by rule, that
notarization is necessary. The difficulty in accomplishing and documenting
notarization for documents that are e-filed and e-served militates against requiring
formal notarization, and notarization often places a significant burden on selfrepresented litigants.”).
226. See, e.g., Klander, supra note 38.
227. See id. at 257. Klander makes the compelling point that with use of the
internet increasing exponentially, many individuals will soon have a more reliable
online address than home address. Id. She invokes the example of Rio Properties,
where plaintiffs were only able to find an online address for the business, and thus
electronic service was approved. Id. (discussing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also supra note 73 (same).
228. Klander, supra note 38, at 257–58.
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notify a defendant of a suit. Furthermore, another commentator,
Rachel Cantor, suggests that service via the internet will not only be
230
more convenient, it will be safer, cheaper, and more reliable.
These assertions demonstrate a portion of the legal community’s
view that the best methods of service are evolving and may not
currently be in place—a view the courts should not ignore.
Although not directly comparable, notice standards in class
action suits also demonstrate the impact and benefit technology
can have in notifying individuals of suit. As previously discussed,
use of the “best notice practicable” standard in class action lawsuits
reflects the legal system’s willingness to embrace the use of
231
technology. In many situations, class members are difficult to
identify, locate, and notify of the action. Thus, a number of courts
have held that notice to class members via technological means is
the best practicable way to notify potential class members of the
232
suit. The law governing class actions, sticking almost exclusively
to notice by mail or notice by publication, did not always embrace
233
these means. Now, however, facing increases in class action suits
and sophistication of technologies, courts are embracing use of
234
technology in class notification.
Service of process standards, in many respects, parallel the
progression of notice standards governing class action suits. As
individuals move away from traditional addresses and focus more
on their online presence, courts will be faced with new challenges
229. Id. at 260 (“Electronic communication has caused the foundation of
Minnesota Rule 4.03 to become archaic, and the evidence of the numerous
judicial and public policy benefits indicates the need for statutory reform. In fact,
the lack of electronic alternatives to service of process may very well be an
unconstitutional oversight.”).
230. See Rachel Cantor, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate
Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 965–66 (1999) (discussing the ways in which
internet service “has the potential to be more secure, . . . more reliable,” and
cheaper).
231. See supra note 79–82 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781(7th Cir. 2004);
Keirsey v. eBay, Inc, No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2014 WL 644697 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14,
2014); In re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
233. See generally Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 786 (“[N]ewspaper notice alone is not
always an adequate alternative to individual notice. The World Wide Web is an
increasingly important method of communication, and, of particular pertinence
here, an increasingly important substitute for newspapers.” (internal citations
omitted)).
234. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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235

regarding service of process standards. With that in mind, it is
likely only a matter of time before the Minnesota Supreme Court
further authorizes use of technology in service of process. If
Minnesota adopts the standard of “reasonable actual notice,” this
transition will be significantly smoother, as the standard will already
account for use of technology.
For example, in 2008, an Australian court authorized the
236
service of documents via Facebook. The court came to this
decision after the plaintiffs attempted—eleven times—to personally
237
serve the defendants but failed. The Australian court, considering
the circumstances, found that serving the defendants via Facebook
238
offered the best opportunity to give the defendants notice. This
Note is in no way suggesting that service via Facebook should be
authorized in a blanket fashion. However, Minnesota would be well
served to take a page out of this Australian case’s book and allow
service by any means if it gives the defendant “reasonable actual
notice.”
3.

Reasonable Actual Notice Aligns with the Policy of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure

When considering a rule, the court should not be handcuffed
to only determining its plain meaning; rather, the court must also
239
consider the intent behind the adoption of the rule. In doing so,
the court should seek to rule in a manner that is most in accord
240
with public policy. The majority in DeCook, in its discussion, took
both of these areas into consideration when it invoked the 2015

235. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
236. See Andriana L. Shultz, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via Social
Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1497 n.1 (2009) (discussing the 2008
Australian case).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Vandenheuvel v. Wagner, 673 N.W.2d 524, 525 (Minn. 2004) (“Rules
of court are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes and are to be
‘construed in the sense in which they were understood and intended at the time
the rule was promulgated.’” (quoting Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1997))).
240. Cf. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“The factors to be considered by the court in
making a proportionality assessment include, without limitation: needs of the case,
amount in controversy, parties’ resources, and complexity and importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation.”).
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241

amendment to Rule 3.01(b) to support its decision. Although the
dissent in DeCook argued that 3.01(b)’s 2015 amendment was not in
242
effect when the claim was brought and was thus irrelevant, the
amendment largely displayed the then-current state of the law.
Thus, the majority pragmatically considered the notions of intent
and public policy in invoking a more fluid interpretation of the law.
Moreover, in general, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
243
give ample discretion to judges in adjudicating disputes. In order
to enforce the policies behind the rules of procedure, judges are
244
given substantial discretion in many situations. In fact, one study
reviewing a number of Minnesota statutes and rules found as many
as 293 instances of judicial discretion in the Minnesota Rules of
245
Civil Procedure. Rule 4, governing service, includes provisions
246
For instance, Rule 4.03(e),
giving discretion to the court.
governing personal service to public corporations, provides that if
service cannot be effectuated according to the enumerated ways in
247
section (e), “the court may direct the manner of such service.” In
addition, Rule 4.04(c)(3), governing service outside the United
States, allows the court to direct service by means “not prohibited
248
by international agreement.” And finally, Rule 4.07, governing
amendments to service, gives the court discretion to “allow any
summons or other process or proof of service thereof to be
249
amended . . . .”
241. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 270 n.8 (Minn.
2016); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84, 88, 67 N.W.2d 635,
638 (1954) (“The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”). One
could argue that the DeCook court, construing the intent of the rules at the time of
adoption, did not find it valid to accept alternative e-mail service until the 2015
amendment was put into place.
242. DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 276 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
243. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(e), .04(c)(3), .07.
244. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “judicial discretion” is defined as
“[t]he exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the
circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law . . . . ” Judicial
Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
245. See Stephen C. Aldrich & Michael Cass, Judicial Discretion Melding Messy
Facts and Pristine Law, BENCH & B. MINN. (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://mnbenchbar.com/2013/11/judicial-discretion/.
246. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.
247. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(e).
248. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(c)(3).
249. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07.
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Reasonable actual notice would continue to give the court
ample discretion in determining if service was valid. Currently, as
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Minnesota rules provide
250
a fair amount of discretion in its rules governing service. Notice
pleading similarly gives the court discretion in determining if a
251
complaint gave the defendant sufficient notice of suit. The term
“actual notice” in the proposed reasonable actual notice standard is
252
akin to the standard governing notice pleading. Thus, the court
would be given substantial discretion in determining whether
service gave sufficient notice to the defendant and, in turn,
whether the defendant had “actual notice.” In addition, the term
“reasonable” seeks to determine if the rules of service were
253
substantially complied with. With substitute service, the court
again has discretion in determining whether the individual served
254
is a person of “suitable age and discretion.” Therefore, in many
instances, the court will have discretion in determining whether
service was substantially complied with—thus aligning with the
discretionary policy behind Rule 4 and the rules of civil procedure.
From the opening of the rules, the court is tasked with issuing
255
rulings that are “just.” Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure sets out the “Scope of [the] Rules” and states that the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
256
Recently, Rule 1’s 2013
determination of every action.”
amendment added more factors to ensure the judicial system’s
257
resources are not abused. Generally, courts approach the rules in
such a way as to ensure that disputes are resolved on merits and not

250. See supra notes 243–49 and accompanying text.
251. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.06 (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.”).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 166–67.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65.
254. See, e.g., Holmen v. Miller, 296 Minn. 99, 105, 206 N.W.2d 916, 920
(1973) (rejecting the argument that an individual served at the age of thirteen is
presumptively not of suitable age and discretion and finding that the defendant
did not offer evidence to show the thirteen-year-old was not of a suitable age and
discretion).
255. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the policy behind all civil decisions).
256. Id.
257. See 1 HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 186, § 1.2 (“The overarching goal of
this provision is to create savings of expense, time of the litigants, and time of the
courts.”).
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258

on mere technicalities.
A reasonable actual notice standard
would better reach this goal.
If courts were to embrace the reasonable actual notice
standard for service, judicial economy would benefit. Judicial
economy is an ever-increasing concern to the American legal
259
system. There are only so many judges and hours available to
referee disputes; nonetheless, each year a staggering number of
260
Americans petition for the help of the courts. Significantly,
district courts must rule on motions to dismiss for insufficient
service of process. In doing so, they are handcuffed to forming
261
their analysis strictly around the lettering of Rule 4. When a party
succeeds in a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process,
262
the case is most often dismissed without prejudice. This allows a
plaintiff to re-file his suit, starting the entire judicial process over
263
again. Presumably, this wastes significant time and resources of
258. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 165, 190 N.W.2d 651,
656 (1971) (“[W]e must . . . be guided by the principle that rules of civil
procedure are designed to effect the settlement of controversies upon their merits
rather than to terminate actions by dismissal on technical grounds. To that end,
Rule 41.01 should be construed liberally, if possible, to avoid depriving a litigant of
his day in court.”).
259. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(“Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to
exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to
them . . . .”).
260. See Infographic: Lawsuits in America, COMMON GOOD (July 17, 2012),
http://www.commongood.org/blog/entry/infographic-lawsuits-in-america
(noting that each year fifteen million civil cases are filed in the United States);
OF
JUST.
STAT.,
State
Court
Caseload
Statistics,
BUREAU
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=30 (last visited Sept. 5, 2016) (profiling
a record high of 102.4 million criminal and civil cases that were filed to state
courts in 2006); cf. Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings in 2015
at Highest Level in Years, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2016/01/articles/securities-litigation/u-s-securities
-class-action-lawsuit-filings-in-2015-at-highest-level-in-years/
(explaining
why
securities class action lawsuits were filed at such a high level in 2015).
261. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (“If the manner of service is not authorized by rule 4, it is not effective.”).
262. See, e.g., Lewis v. Contracting Nw., Inc., 413 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (“The proper action to be taken by the court, if it finds insufficient
service of process, is to dismiss the action without prejudice.” (quoting 1 DAVID F.
HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 12.8
(1985) (emphasis omitted))).
263. See Dismissal Without Prejudice, BLACK’S, supra note 244 (defining dismissal
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both the court and the parties involved—resources that would be
better spent adjudicating the merits of the case. Thus, such a strict
interpretation around the rules of service quite possibly leads to
less, not more, efficiency.
The reasonable actual notice standard would give courts the
breathing room needed to adjudicate cases more efficiently.
Currently, as discussed above, the courts may only deem service
effective if the method of service is clearly stated in the rule or an
264
alternative method of service has been proven. The current
method leaves out an array of situations where an individual may
have substantially complied with the rules of service, the defendant
was on notice of the suit, and yet the case was dismissed because
265
the service did not follow the black letter of the law. Reasonable
actual notice, however, would allow a party to prove that it did, in
fact, substantially comply with the rules of service, the defendant
266
had knowledge of the suit, and, thus, service was proper. The
court, then, has the opportunity to measure the level of compliance
with the reasonable actual notice standard against numerous other
factors, such as time, money, and the court’s resources. Therefore,
reasonable actual notice would help prevent the logjam of cases,
repeated dismissals, and refiling of claims that often occur in
267
Minnesota courts. With those principles in mind, reasonable
actual notice could lead to a more efficient judicial system without
sacrificing judicial integrity.
B.

The Reasonable Actual Notice Burden-Shifting Framework Would Not
Signal a Significant Departure from the Current Burden-Shifting
Framework

The focus on which party carries the burden of proving
268
effective service in DeCook is not misplaced. If a plaintiff claims an
alternative method of service was effective, the court looks to a

without prejudice as “[a] dismissal that does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the
lawsuit within the applicable limitations period”).
264. See, e.g., Allen, 590 N.W.2d at 822.
265. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 302
(Minn. 2011); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1988).
266. See infra Section IV.B.
267. See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text.
268. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 272 (Minn. 2016);
id. at 272–73 (Dietzen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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burden-shifting framework in its analysis. First, the plaintiff has
the burden to produce evidence of an agreement between the
270
parties. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that no
271
agreement exists and, thus, service was ineffective.
Minnesota courts, however, should focus less on proving
whether an alternative method of service was consented to and
more on whether the service gave reasonable actual notice. If
Minnesota courts were to adopt the proposed reasonable actual
notice standard, a slightly modified burden-shifting framework
should apply. First, the plaintiff should carry the burden to show he
272
made a good faith effort to comply with the rules of service and
273
provided the defendant with reasonable notice of legal action.
Then, the burden should shift to the defendant to show that: (1)
274
the plaintiff did not act in good faith; (2) the defendant did not
275
or (3) the
have reasonable actual notice of legal action;
276
defendant was excessively burdened by the method of service.
Although defendants should continue to carry a higher burden of
277
persuasion, having three potential alternative arguments would
give them ample opportunity to establish a viable defense. Overall,
this method would better serve the legal system’s goal of ensuring
278
conflicts are resolved on their merits—not on mere technicalities.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many observers and commentators on both sides of
279
280
the service aisle. Some take a fairly strict view of service; others
269. See supra text accompanying note 58–61.
270. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W. 2d 377, 384 (Minn. 2008).
271. Id.
272. Cf. Columbia Placer Co. v. Bucyrus Steam Shovel & Dredge Co., 60 Minn.
142, 144–45, 62 N.W. 115, 116 (1895) (holding that when a plaintiff invites a
defendant into the forum state to settle a dispute, service will not be proper unless
made in good faith by the plaintiff).
273. See supra Section IV.A.
274. Cf. Columbia, 60 Minn. at 145, 62 N.W. at 116.
275. See supra Section IV.A.
276. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.07.
277. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. 2016).
278. See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273 v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 164, 190
N.W.2d 651, 655 (1971).
279. Cf. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal
Construction, 64 ALB. L. REV. 9, 13 (2000) (“[S]trict or liberal construction can be
found in cases arising under statutes spanning almost the entire alphabet—from
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281

take a rather pragmatic view. Each side, however, can likely agree
that the rules of civil procedure exist to ensure that the courts have
282
the ability to give substantial justice. Courts are often tasked with
283
solving difficult issues of service. These issues include anything
284
from defendants evading service to determining whether to allow
285
or deciding whether service was
amendments to service
286
effective.
These issues can lead to disputes and jam the
287
courthouse doors. Minnesota courts could take a step in the
direction of efficiency and justice by adopting the “reasonable
actual notice” standard.
Some may point to this standard as carrying its fair share of
risks. Most evidently, plaintiffs may attempt to take advantage of
288
what some could interpret as a more relaxed standard of service.
Currently though, the legal system often finds itself wrestling with
289
defendants evading service, leaving plaintiffs with fewer options
to satisfy due process requirements. In addition, the proposed
modified burden-shifting framework that goes along with
reasonable actual notice would operate to counteract any perceived
290
advantage given to plaintiffs. Thus, the reasonable actual notice
standard would not be advantageous to either the plaintiff or the

Adoption to Unemployment Compensation.”).
280. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990) (arguing that all criminal statutes should be strictly
construed).
281. See, e.g., Klander, supra note 38, at 250 (opining that the Minnesota
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to reevaluate an archaic rule).
282. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rule] shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”).
283. See, e.g., DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn.
2016).
284. See, e.g., In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2000).
285. See, e.g., Tharp v. Tharp, 228 Minn. 23, 27, 36 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (1949).
286. See supra text accompanying note 41.
287. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
288. Cf. James Comber, Gareth Hughes & Emily Austin, Playing by the Rules or
Playing Games? The Risks of Taking Advantage of an Opponent’s Mistakes in Litigation,
(June
2016),
https://www.ashurst.com/publication-item
ASHURST
.aspx?id_Content=13235 (“Both the English and Hong Kong cases highlight that
parties must ensure litigation is conducted efficiently and avoid game playing over
procedural errors by opponents.”).
289. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Section IV.B.
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defendant; rather, the standard would be advantageous to the
justice system as a whole.
The reasonable actual notice standard would aid Minnesota’s
legal system in its continued oversight of the principles governing
service. Whether it be discussing the merits of alternative service in
291
292
DeCook, or actual notice in Jaeger, issues of service are clearly at
the forefront of our legal landscape. Typically, the legal system
strives to make doctrinal changes in gradual, incremental
293
fashion. This allows courts to be adaptive while still cautioning
against making brash, knee-jerk decisions that will seem outdated
294
within a few years. The proposed “reasonable actual notice”
standard accounts for that concern by implementing a broad rule
that allows courts to continue to substantially stick to the rules of
civil procedure and precedent while remaining flexible for what is
295
most in accord with justice. The alternative, relying on future
Supreme Court decisions to interpret and overrule previous cases,
has the potential to implement far reaching change, but it may not
age well, and it may even lead to more uncertainty and unreliability
in service. Adopting the proposed “reasonable actual notice”
standard alongside a slightly modified burden-shifting framework,
however, could operate to make our justice system fairer through a
relatively small, incremental change.

291. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2016).
292. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Minn. 2016).
293. Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 815, 816 (2010) (“Since legislatures, courts, executive officers,
administrative agencies, and even voters interact, incremental lawmaking is often
the strategy most respectful of each player’s role . . . . Leading commentators
encourage incrementalism.”).
294. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362–66
(2006) (discussing the doctrine of judicial minimalism, which encourages judges
to make small changes and avoid broad sweeping rulings).
295. See supra Part IV.
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